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SALES - IMPLIED WARRANTY - PRMTY OF CONTRACT AS A PREREQUISITE 
TO RECOVERY FROM MANUFACTURER - Plaintiff sustained injuries in the 
course of his employment when a defective abrasive wheel, while being 
used in its intended manner, exploded in his face. The abrasive wheel ·was 
purchased by plaintiff's employer directly from the manufacturer. Plain-
tiff sought recovery from the manufacturer on two grounds: negligence in 
the manufacture of the abrasive wheel and breach of implied warranty for 
fitness of purpose.1 The negligence issue was submitted to the jury, which 
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1735 (2) and (5), which correspond to UNIFOR?.I SALES Acr § 15 
(2) (implied warranty of merchantable quality) and (5) (implied warranty of fitness 
of purpose annexed by the usage of trade). 
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returned a verdict adverse to the plaintiff. The manufacturer's demurrer 
to the cause of action based upon implied warranty was sustained by the 
trial court. On appeal from the ruling on the demurrer, held, reversed. 
A manufacturer is liable under an implied warranty for fitness of purpose 
not only to a purchaser but also to an employee of that purchaser who sus-
tains injuries from the use of the defective chattel in the employer's business. 
Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1960). 
Originally, where injuries resulted from a defective chattel, recovery 
under either negligence or warranty required privity of contract between 
plaintiff and manufacturer.2 Though exceptions were recognized,3 not 
until Ji.[acPherson v. Buick Motor Company4 was a general test of fore-
seeable harm formulated for product liability cases based upon a negligence 
theory. Now it is well settled that a manufacturer owes a duty of due care 
to all persons who might reasonably be expected to come into contact 
with the chattel and to sustain injuries from a defect which the manu-
facturer might have prevented.5 However, privity of contract remains a 
general prerequisite to recovery for breach of implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness of purpose.6 The conceptual problem can be traced 
to the traditional notion that warranty is contractual in nature. Thus the 
absence of contractual relationship has interfered with extension of the 
manufacturer's liability for breach of warranty beyond the purchaser. 
Nevertheless, more recent developments in warranty parallel the recognition 
of strict liability in tort law. The classic area of strict liability is that of 
the ultrahazardous activity. One who engages in an ultrahazardous occupa-
tion must assume responsibility for any injuries or damages without regard 
to fault on his part.7 In the area of implied warranties, some courts while 
in general retaining the privity of contract requirement have recognized 
exceptions. Because of the high degree of risk to human beings, many 
American jurisdictions permit recovery on a theory of warranty where in-
jury results from unwholesome food.8 Even those courts which do recognize 
the food exceptions have manifested considerable reluctance to extend the 
relaxation of the privity requirement to other classes of products.9 To 
draw a line between food and other types of products seems unnecessarily 
arbitrary. If unwholesome food is so potentially dangerous that its sale 
can be classified as an ultrahazardous activity justifying strict liability,1 0 
it would seem that a defective abrasive wheel which can explode and cause 
2 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). 
s See Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865, 870 (8th Cir. 1903). 
4 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
Ii See generally PROSSER, TORTS 498-506 (2d ed. 1955). 
6 Id. at 506-11. 
7 See, e.g., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928). 
8 E.g., Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939). 
9 See, e.g., Burr v. Shemin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P .2d 1041 (1954). 
10 Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products 
-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 941 (1957). 
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serious injury comes within the same rationale.11 Therefore, if risk of per-
sonal injury is the test of liability, recovery follows as clearly in the prin-
cipal case as in the food cases.12 Moreover, since the abrasive wheel exploded 
when first used, plaintiff appears to have been in no better position to pro-
tect himself than the inexperienced consumer who sustains injuries from 
unwholesome food.13 Also, to preclude recovery by the worker in the prin-
cipal case would in effect insulate the manufacturer from liability under 
implied warranty, for the corporate purchaser can "suffer" a serious injury 
only if forced to compensate the worker in a tort action. Since such direct 
recovery from the employer is unlikely under the facts of the principal 
case,14 the implied warranty is significant only if it extends to the ulti-
mate user. The manufacturer should not be able to avoid liability in this 
case on the ground that an alleged defect in the chattel has caused injury 
to a remote person, for the employees of the purchaser are the persons most 
likely to use the chattel and sustain injury if it should be defective. The 
court in the principal case accepted this last argument as the basis115 for its 
decision although policy considerations also suggest that a general relaxation 
of the privity requirement in product liability cases is desirable.10 The 
manufacturer can protect the intended user either through improvements 
in the product or by spreading the cost through insurance1 7 or higher 
11 On facts similar to the principal case, recovery was permitted under implied war-
ranty in DiVello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951). Wood v. Gen• 
eral Electric Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, ll2 N.E.2d 8 (1953) seemed to overrule DiVello, but 
see Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958). 
12 See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.16 n.14 (1956). 
13 See Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955), where 
the court was influenced by the fact that defendant lumber mill was in no better position 
than plaintiff, an experienced carpenter, to inspect the lumber for defects. See Green, 
Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negligence1 24 TENN. 
L. REv. 928 (1957), in which the writer tries to distinguish food and chemical products 
from mechanical products. He places emphasis on the fact that mechanical products 
are typically produced for use over a longer period of time by rather experienced workers. 
The distinction is not persuasive given the facts of the principal case where the acci• 
dent, which occurred upon the first use, appeared to result from a latent defect. 
14 The apparent cause of the accident was a latent defect in the grinding wheel 
which normally would not be subject to employer's control. 
15 Principal case at 581. An alternative basis for the decision was the court's con-
clusion that plaintiff meets the privity requirement which they defined as "mutual or 
successive relationship to the same thing or right of property," principal case at 581. Pro• 
ponents of the privity requirement will surely recognize this vague test, when applied in 
warranty cases, to be the embryonic stage of another court-created "fiction" which could 
ultimately engulf the privity requirement. In warranty cases, the substance of privity 
has been the requirement of a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant. 
Conceptually, the California court's definition might have eliminated the hard-fought 
battle for privity exceptions in circumstances such as the one presented when husband 
sustains injury from unwholesome food purchased by his wife. The demise of privity 
in warranty cases will probably be hastened if the court's alternative holding is taken 
seriously. 
16 See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, lll4 (1960). 
17 But see id. at ll21. 
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prices.is Thus, in most cases society, not the individual manufacturer, will 
bear the burden. This seems desirable, for the burden on the individual who 
is injured may be catastrophic though the total amount involved in product 
liability cases is rather low when viewed from the standpoint of society. 
Moreover, in some situations strict liability may be indirectly achieved, 
for plaintiff may be able to recover from the warrantee who in turn can 
pursue his rights under the warranty. It would seem preferable to avoid this 
circuitous route. Also, because specific evidence of negligence is rarely 
available in product liability cases, plaintiff typically relies upon res ipsa 
loquitur to get the case to the jury.19 If strict liability results, in fact, from 
the use of a negligence theory, it would seem more desirable to face the 
problem squarely and thus protect the integrity of an important negligence 
concept. The trend in the current cases appears to be toward a general 
relaxation of the privity requirement;20 eventually there may appear in 
the area of product warranty liability another MacPherson case in which 
the exceptions swallow up the rule. 
John L. Peschel, S. Ed. 
18 See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 28.16 (1956); Escola v. Coca Cola Bot• 
tling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,462, 150 P.2d 436,440 (1944) (concurring opinion). Strict liability 
in the product liability cases would probably impose a significant burden on a small 
business which is operating on a marginal profit and has a limited capacity to imple-
ment price changes. 
10 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra note 18. 
20 See, e.g., Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); 
Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 
(1958); Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. Cornelius, 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958); 
see generally Prosser, supra note 16. 
